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I. Introduction
On October6, 1979, the Federal Reserve changed
the way it controlled money from establishing tar-
gets for short-term interest rates to focusing on
targets for bank reserves. The new procedure was
expected to result in more interest rate volatility as
the rates were freed to respond to market forces.
The procedure was also intended to achieve better
control of the monetary aggregates. Since October
1979, interest rate volatility has increased, and
monetary control has improved on an annual basis.
But surprisingly, the monetary aggregates became
more volatile on a short-term basis.
In February, 1981, the Federal Reserve published
results ofa System study evaluating the experience
under the new control procedure. [ The study con-
cluded that the increased volatility ofthe monetary
aggregates in 1980 was caused, in part, by unusual-
ly large shocks to the money and credit markets.
The largest of these shocks came from the Special
Credit Control Program implemented in the Spring
of 1980. A second conclusion was that more accu-
rate short-run control might have been achieved by
more aggressive adjustments in the reserves targets
when the quantity ofmoney departed from target. 2
However, the study also concluded that closer
*Research Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco. I am indebted to Adrian W. Throop for
enlightening discussions of the issues discussed
in this paper. Lloyd Dixon provided research
assistance.
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short-run control would most likely entail large
increases in interest rate volatility, which could
seriously inhibit the performance ofthe economy.
The present study therefore has two main pur-
poses. The first is to describe how the reserve-
oriented monetary control procedure works, in
theory and in practice.** The second is to assess the
effectiveness of the new procedure as it has been
implemented. A key feature of any control proce-
dure is how quickly it brings the quantity ofmoney
back to a set target when deviations occur. The
evidence in this paperfor 1981 through the first half
of 1982 suggests that the Federal Reserve has con-
tinued to follow procedures producing relatively
gradual re-entry to the annual target ranges that
form the basis of monetary policy. But unlike the
earlier study noted above, this study suggests that
deviations could be eliminated more rapidly without
incurring large increases in interest rate volatility.
**This paper was written in the middle of 1982,
prior to the reduction in emphasis by the FOMC on
MI targeting and the major deposit regulation that
occurred in the latter part of 1982. Thus, the mone-
tary control procedures described and analyzed are
those that prevailed in mid-1982.
For a discussion ofthe issues raised by using Ml
as an intermediate target under interest rate deregu-
lation, see John P. Judd and John L. Scadding,
"Financial Change and Monetary Targeting in the
United States," available from the authors.II. Money andReserve ControlProcedures
The Federal Reserve attempts to promote full years that inflation is reduced with the smallest
employment growth at low rates of inflation by possible adverseeffectson outputandemployment.
maintaininggrowthrates in certainmonetary aggre- In recent years, innovations in cash management
gates that are compatible with its objectives. Each have made the job of setting appropriate annual
year the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMe) growth rates. for the aggregates more difficult.
sets annualgrowth-rate targetrangesfor the mone- These innovations have frequently suggested to pol-
tary (and credit) aggregates. These extend from the icymakers that the public's demand for money is
fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth shifting and that growth rate objectives for the
quarter of the current year. In 1982, for example, aggregates must accommodate these shifts in order
the range for Ml is 2V2 to 51 /2 percent (see Figure to avoid undesired affects on the economy. For
1).3 Although ranges are specified for Ml, M2, M3 example, ifthe demand for money shifts down and
and bank credit, only those for Ml and M2 have had supply is not also lowered, interest rates will fall
much operational significance since October 1979. and monetary policy will have been too expansion-
These ranges represent the FOMe's goals for aver- ary. In 1981, the Fed essentially aimed to keep the
age annual money growth. They reflectthe long-run quantity of money as measured by Ml near the
policy of gradually lowering the rate of inflation. lower boundary of the target range because the
Overthe past three years, the growth rate ranges for demand for MI appeared to be shifting downward.
MI have been reduced by about V2 percent each By mid-1982, the Fed was content to see Ml at the
year. The goal ofthis gradualist policy is to reduce top of its annual range because of a perceived up-
growth in money slowly enough over a number of ward shift in the demand for MI.
Figure 1
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8The purpose of this paper is not to evaluate the
Federal Reserve's attempts to achieve its macro
economic goals, but rather to assess the Fed's pro-
cedure for controlling the monetary aggregates in
the short-run. Thus, the annual growth rate objec-
tives for MI are taken as the starting point, without
evaluating whether these were the appropriate
target ranges for achieving the Fed's macroeco-
nomic goals.
Short-Run MonetaryPaths
The Fed's monetary control procedure can be
divided into three levels.
4 The first level involves
the choice ofshort-run paths for the monetary ag-
gregates (Ml and M2) by the FOMC at each ofits
meetings. In the final month of each quarter, a
three-month path is chosen to cover the next quar-
ter: e.g., on March 31, 1981 a path was chosen for
March to June (see line marked (2) in Figure 2).
These quarterly paths are sometimes revised in the
final two months ofthe quarter. An example ofsuch
a revision occurred on May 18, 1981, when an Ml
path for April to June was specified-see the line
denoted (3) in Figure 2. This latter path supplanted
the original secondquarter path.
The short-run paths define the FOMC's preferred
rate ofre-entry to the longer-run target ranges. For
example, again considerthe secondquarterof1981.
At its March 31 meeting, the Committee chose a
growth rate of5-6 percent for MI, (plotted as 51 /2
percent in Figure 2 and denoted as (2) ) beginning
from a March base that was well below the lower
boundary of the annual target range. The March
path "pointed" MI back toward its range, and
would have achieved the lower boundary of the

















415 ............_ ......-The paths for 1981 and 1982 suggest that the
Committee's desired rate of re-entry to the annual
range was relatively slow.
5 Each month, the Com-
mittee sought to eliminate only a small part of the
previous month's deviation of Ml from the annual
target range. The shortest re-entry horizon in 1981
was contained in the first quarter path (denoted as
(1) in Figure I), which would have reached the
lower boundary ofthe annual range in early April,
about three months after the January deviation just
prior to the FOMC meeting in early February.
The path denoted 5 would have reached the lower
boundary of the annual range in four months, and
those denoted 2 and 4 would have reached the lower
boundary in 5 months. Finally, paths 6, 7 and 8,
chosen for the fourth quarterof 1981 would not have
attained the annual lower boundary by the end of
that year. Attempted re-entry in the first halfof1982
was somewhatfaster. The pathdenoted 2 in Figure 1
would have achieved the upper boundary of the
target range in four months, while the paths denoted
as 3 and 4, reach the upper boundary in three and
two months, respectively.
The choice of a relatively slow re-entry rate ap-
parently reflects the view that faster re-entry would
involve excessive amounts ofinterest rate volatility.
This point was made in the February 1981 Federal
Reseve Staff study of the new reserve control pro-
cedures. This study concluded that a faster re-entry
rate than had been used in 1980 would have pro-
vided only marginally closer month-to-month con-
trol of Ml at the expense of substantially greater
volatility in the Federal funds rate. 6
Paths for the Reserve Aggregates
The second level of the monetary control pro-
cedures translates the short-run paths for Ml and
M2 into a path for total reserves over periods be-
tween FOMC meetings. These total reserve paths
are calculated by multiplying the appropriate re-
serve requirement ratios by projections ofthe vari-
ous reservable liabilities of depository institutions
thought to be consistent with the paths for Ml and
M2.
7 Since the Fed imposes different reserve re-
quirement ratios on the various components ofMl
and M2, and oninstruments not in these aggregates,
the calculation of the current total reserve paths
depends on accurate estimates ofmovements in the
components of Ml and M2 and ofother reservable
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instruments. The Fed must also project reserves
held in excess ofreserve requirements. These com-
positional changes require adjustments of the total
reserves paths to make them consistent with un-
changed paths for MI and M2. These so-called
technical, or "multiplier," adjustments are made
when necessary on a week-by-week basis. The dis-
cussion in the remainderofthe paper abstracts from
these technical adjustments, and focuses instead
on reserve changes designed to be consistent with
changes in the Ml and M2 paths.
The third level' ofthe control procedure involves
the use of a reserves instrument to achieve the
short-run paths for Ml and M2. Undercertain insti-
tutional arrangements, the Federal Reserve has the
option of directly manipulating total reserves to
control money. However, this approach has not
been feasible because of the existing practice of
lagged reserve accounting (LRR). 8 This reserve ac-
counting rule requires banks to hold an amount of
reserves in any given week based on deposits held
two weeks earlier. Banks' required reserves are
therefore predetermined in any given week. The
Fed, for its part, must supply the banking system
with enough reserves to meet the requirement. Ifthe
Fed did not do so, it would force some individual
banks into a reserve deficiency beyond their con-
trol. Thus under LRR, the Fed is not in aposition to
use total reserves as the money control instrument
on a weekly basis.
The Fed's way ofdealing with this problem is to
use as its control instrument the proportion oftotal
reserves provided to banks through the Federal Re-
serve discount window. IftheFed wants to pursue a
tightermoney policy, for example, it supplies fewer
reserves outright to the market through open market
operations (i.e., fewer non-borrowed reserves).
This means that banks will have to acquire a larger
proportion oftheir predetermined required reserves
by borrowing at the discount window. Banks, how-
ever, are reluctant to go to the discount window
because the Fed imposes restrictions on the quantity
and frequency of loans it will make to individual
banks over specified periods oftime. 9 Thus, when
the Fed provides fewer non-borrowed reserves, the
Federal funds rate must rise relative to the discount
rate to inducebanks to use up more oftheiravailable
credit at the discount window. Such increases in the
funds rate slow growth in money andtotal reserves.Figure 3
lag, to slower growth in the demand by banks for
total reserves. Thus, over periods longer than two
weeks, the demand for reserves responds to the
funds rate and so reserves and the funds rate fall
from point B to point C.
Ifthe Fed could predict the supply ofanddemand
for money and reserves with certainty, it could
always achieve its desired paths (overperiods long-
erthan two weeks) by setting nonborrowed reserves
at a level such that RS intersects the long-run re-
serves demand curve at the desired leveI of total
reserves. Unfortunately, neither RdnorRS is known
with certainty. For example, unexpected shifts in
banks' reluctance to borrow affect R
S
. Unexpected
changes in the public's demand for Ml and bank
credit affect Rd.
Nevertheless, monetary control procedures af-
fect the extent to which the money supply is affected
by these and other shocks. For example, lagged
reserve accounting allows money to be pushed
away from the target path to a greater extent than
does contemporaneous accounting. Under LRR,
sudden changes in the public's demand for money
affect banks' demand for reserves, and thus the
funds rate, with a lag of two weeks. Money is
therefore, more susceptible to shocks because the
interest rate changes needed to moderate deviations
This method of monetary and reserve control is
illustrated in Figure 3. Consider first the supply of
total reserves, R
S
, which consistsoftwo parts. First,
so-called nonborrowed reserves (RU) are provided
outright to the banking system when the Fed buys
open market securities (e.g., Treasury bills) from
the public and pays for the securities with bank
reserves. Because the Fed directly controls the
amount of nonborrowed reserves, this portion of
total reserves does not respond to the Federal funds
rate, and is depicted by the vertical portion ofRs.
Second, borrowed reserves (RB) are provided
when the Fed lends reserves to banks through its
discount window. As noted earlier, the quantity of
borrowed reserves will rise only if the funds rate
increases sufficiently above the discount rate to
overcome banks' reluctance to borrow. Thusbanks'
demand curve ofborrowed reserves is upward slop-
ing when the funds rate is above the discount rate.
The upward sloping portion of RS represents the
sum of borrowed reserves, which respond posi-
tively to the funds rate, plus a fixed amount of
nonboITowed reserves. (Note that the kink in R
S
occurs where the funds rate equals the discount rate
and borrowed reserves are zero. Up to this point,
total reserves are composed entirely ofnonborrow-
ed reserves, andthus R
S is vertical.)
As noted above, banks' demand for total reserves
is predetermined in any given week under LRR.
Thus, the short-run demand for reserves, R
D
sR, is
vertical. However, over periods longer than two
weeks, total reserves respond to changes in the
quantity of deposits banks issue. Since a higher
funds rate restrains deposit growth, the long-run
reserves demand, R~.R' is negatively sloped with
respect to the funds rate.
Assume that point A in Figure 3 represents an
initial starting point, where total reserves (R*) and
the funds rate (iF*) correspond to the level ofMI on
its path. Now, suppose the Fed reduces its desired
level for MI. This requires a tighter policy in the
reserves market, which means a reduction in non-
borrowed reserves from RU[* to RU 2*. In the short-
run, this action raises borrowings (from RB [ to
RB 2) by an equal amount and raises iF to point B,
because the demand for reserves is fixed. However,
the higher funds rate restrains money growth con-










Total Reservesofmoney from target are delayed. Undercontempo-
raneous reserve accounting (CRR) (where current
reserve requirements are determined by current
deposits), these moderating interest rate changes
occurimmediately, contributing to tightermonetary
control. The Federal Reserve has recently an-
nounced its intention to switch to CRR in 1984.
The operating instrument used for monetary con-
trol also has an importanteffecton the susceptibility
of money to shocks. In October 1979, the Fed
switched from using the Federal funds rate to using
nonborrowed reserves as its instrument of control.
The funds rate approach had the disadvantage that
unanticipatedchanges in the demand for money and
reserves were often accommodated by automatic
increases in the supply ofreserves as the Fed held its
funds rate instrument constant. This accommoda-
tion does not occurto the same extent under present
procedures, since the Fed often holds nonborrowed
reserves constant when unanticipated changes in
money and reserves demand occur. With RU fixed,
an increase in money and total reserves demand
automatically causes borrowed reserves to rise.
Greater borrowing at the window causes the funds
rate to rise, which tends to retard the increase in
money,·leading to"a smaller monetary control error.
Some analysts argue that a total reserves instrument
would be even more effective in this regard, butthis
remains a matterin dispute. 10 The Federal Reserve's
switch to CRR will at least give the System the
option of using a total reserves instrument, an op-
tion not feasible under LRR.
III. Choosing the Nonborrowed Reserve Path
Another important feature of the monetary con-
trol procedure, and the focus of this paper, is how
quickly the Fed attempts to reenter the longer run
target ranges once deviations occur: i.e. how ag-
gressively does the Fed act to offset monetary con-
trol errors? The aggressiveness ofmonetary control
actions can be measured by the size of changes in
nonborrowed reserves initiated by the Fed in re-
sponse to deviations of money and total reserves
from path. For example, when money overshoots
its path, nonborrowed reserves must be lowered in
order to raise the funds rate and eventually make
money fall backto its path. All elseequal, the larger
the reduction in nonborrowed reserves, the more
rapidly money will go back to path.
The Fed's method ofchoosing nonborrowed re-
serves paths involves two basic elements. The first
element is the FaMe's choice ofa so-called initial
borrowing assumption. In addition to choosing
paths for Ml and M2, which are translated by the
staff into a total reserves path, the FOMC also
chooses an initial borrowing "assumption" for the
interrneeting period. The total reserves path minus
the borrowing assumption is the initial nonbor-
rowed reserves path level to be aimed for by the
Federal Reserve Bank ofNew York Trading Desk.
Thus whenthe FOMC chooses paths forMl and M2
and an initial borrowing assumption it simulta-
neously chooses a nonborrowed reserves path.
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At each meeting the FOMC is presented by the
staffwith a menu of(usually) three short-run policy
alternatives, typically representing possible
"tight," "easy" and "status quo" policies. Each
alternative contains a combination ofpaths for Ml
and M2, a borrowing assumption, and a Federal
funds rate range." The staffdesigns each path to be
internally consistent, that is, the staffprojects that a
given level of borrowing would be necessary to
achieve the corresponding short-run Ml and M2
paths by the end ofthe period they cover. Thus by
construction, the nonborrowed reserves path
(which is calculated on the basis of the initial bor-
rowing assumption) is an initial guess at the level of
nonborrowed reserves consistent with achieving the
short-run monetary aggregates paths. Since the Ml
and M2 paths typically reflect an attempt to re-enter
the annual target range gradually, so do the nonbor-
rowed reserve paths.
The second element in the Fed's choice of a
nonborrowed reserve path involves intermeeting
adjustments ofthe initial nonborrowed path. Since
October 1979, the nonborrowed path has sometimes
beenchanged between FOMC meetings in response
to projected deviations of total reserves from path.
When total reserves have been projected to be de-
viating from path during control periods by asignif-
icant amount, nonborrowed reserves have some-
times been changed in the opposite direction tospeed the movement of MI back to path. Assume,
for example, that total reserves are above path.
Holding the path for nonborrowed reserves at its
original level would limit the total reserves over-
shoot to consist of borrowed reserves. Higher bor-
rowing would raise the funds rate and help bringMI
and total reserves back to path. The intermeeting
adjustments involve raising borrowing and the
funds rate even further, by reducing the nonbor-
rowed reserves path from its original level, thereby
inducing MI and total reserves to move back to path
more rapidly.
These intermeeting adjustments were used more
frequently in 1980 than in 1981 and their size has
varied widely amongcontrol periods. In 1980, there
were six such adjustments ranging in size from
around 25 percent of the total reserve deviation to
around 125 percent. 12 In 1981, there were two such
adjustments, one that was larger than the total re-
serve deviation, and a second one that was smaller.
Fewer intermeeting adjustments were made in
1981, in part because MI and M2 often gave con-
flicting signals-M2 was oftenabove its path when
Ml was below its path.
There have also been several control periods in
1980-81 when flonborrowed reserves were changed
during intermeeting periods in the samedirection as
total reserve deviations. These actions tended to
reinforce total reserve deviations rather than offset
them. An example is in April of 1980 (during the
period of the Special Credit Controls), when non-
borrowed reserves came in below their initial paths
in an intermeeting period in which total reserves
were well below path. This development reinforced
the weaknessin MI andtotal reserves in that period,
but cushioned the declines·in interest rates that were
occurring simultaneously. Two such reinforcing
changes occurred in nonborrowed reserves in inter-
meeting periods in 1980, and three occurred in
1981
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As shown earlier, the FOMe's choice of initial
nonborrowed reserves paths represents relatively
gradual rates of re-entry to the longer-run target
ranges. However, to evaluate the reserve control
procedure as a whole, we must also take accountof
the adjustments to these initial paths made in the
intermeeting periods. These latter actions serve as
mid-course corrections in response to the latest
data. They do not, however, convert gradual re-
entry into rapid re-entry. These mid-course correc-
tions were designed to keep on the pre-determined
gradual short-run paths. Moreover, the sporadic use
ofintermeeting adjustments suggests that they have
not been a major factor holding Ml to its short-run
paths, especially in 1981.
IV. Rates ofRe-Entry
The previous section showed that under current
operating procedures the Fed sets its nonborrowed
reserves path to be consistent with gradual rates of
re-entry ofMl and M2 to the annual target ranges.
The major argument advanced for gradual re-entry
is that it helps stabilize interestrates. Implicit in this
argument is the point that attempts to get backto the
annual target ranges more quickly would require
largerchanges in interest rates. These sharp interest
rate changes, in turn, can disrupt financial flows
and weaken the performance ofthe economy. 14
How aggressively should policy attempt to return
Ml and M2 to the annual ranges? This is an empiri-
cal question the answerto which depends on several
factors. The first issue concerns the size of the
response in short-term interest rates elicited by the
changes in nonborrowed reserves necessary to
achieve given rates of re-entry. The remainder of
13
this section examines this factor. Two other factors
will be discussed later: The relative benefits pro-
vided to the economy by more stable money market
interest rates in the short-run versus less persistent
deviations of Ml from target, and the nature of
deviations, that is, whether or not they are self
correcting.
Conceptual Framework
An analysis ofhow much increase in interest rate
volatility will accompany faster re-entry, in part,
depends on empirical estimates ofthe demand and
supply relationships in the markets for money and
reserves. We have used the San Francisco money
market model to estimate the size of changes in
short-terminterest rates requiredfor various rates of
MI re-entry to the annual target ranges. The model
is a monthly structural model which describes thebehavior of banks, the nonbank public, and the
Federal Reserve in the markets for bank reserves,
deposits and bank loans. 15
The SFmodel contains aconventional borrowing
function in which banks' demand for borrowed re-
serves depends positively on the funds rates, and
negatively on the discount rate, whenever the funds
rate is above the discount rate. Thus the model's
supply oftotal reserves schedule looks like the one
shown in Figure 3.
In the model, banks' demand for total reserves
varies negatively with respect to the Federal funds
rate. Since banks' demand for reserves results pri-
marily from reserve requirements, the reserve de-
mand function reflects the response of deposits to
the Federal funds rate. The inverse relationship
between the funds rate and deposits depends mainly
on two relationships. First, arbitrage in financial
markets means that rates on longer-term money
market instruments, like commercial paper, tend to
move up and down with the federal funds rate. The
commercial paper rate represents the interest fore-
gone from holding transactions deposits. For this
reason, increases in the paperrate induce the public
to hold fewer transactions deposits, and banks con-
sequently need supply fewer ofthese deposits. This
is one way in which a higher funds rate reduces Ml
and reserves demand. It is the channel of influence
common to most money market models.
Second, bank loans act as a catalyst in another
channel ofinfluence unique to the SF model. Banks
compete to make loans to the public by setting their
loan rates relative to rates available in direct finance
markets like those for commercial paper and cor-
porate bonds. For any given level of GNP, the
public's demand for bank loans depends negatively
on the prime rate and positively on the commercial
paper rate. Thus, as the prime rate falls relative to
the commercial paper rate, banks issue more loans
in response to rising demand by the public. Since
the proceeds ofthese loans are generally paid in the
fonn of transactions deposits, increases in MI and
reserves demand are the immediate effect of loan
extensions. These newly created deposits tend to
stay in the public's portfolio of assets, and thus
affect observed MI, for up to six months, according
to the empiricalestimates. 16
Changes in the funds rate affect bank loans and
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Ml through the prime rate. For example, an in-
crease in the funds rate induces a higher prime rate
because banks set their prime rates at a variable
markup over their cost ofobtaining funds to lend.
Since the funds rate forms the base ofthose borrow-
ing costs, the prime rate tends to move up or down
with <;urrent and lagged funds rates. Thus, if the
Federal Reserve takes actions that raise the funds
rate,this raisesthe prime rate. A higher prime rate
causes thesupplyofmoney to fall by lowering bank
loans. 17
The presence of bank loan effects means that
changes in nonborrowed reserves have a larger ef-
fect on Ml and a smaller effect on money market
interest rates. An increase in RU, for example,
reduces the Federal funds rate and raises MI in two
ways. First, the lower funds rate lowers the com-
mercial paper rate, thereby raising the public's un-
derlying demand for money. Second, higher non-
borrowed reserves raise Ml via increases in bank
loans, as lower funds rates cause the prime lending
rate to fall. This added response of Ml to money
market interest rates means that given changes in
MI can be accomplished with smaller changes in
interest rates. Bank loan effects therefore have an
important implication for monetary control-the
costs ofshort-run control (interest rate volatility)
are less than conventional models (without bank
loan effects) wouldsuggest.
Empirical Results
The money market model was used to estimate
the changes in the commercial paper rate needed to
eliminate given deviations of Ml from target over
different periods of time. 18 The analysis applies to
MI deviations that are persistent, in the sense that
they would not be eliminated without Federal Re-
serve action. The estimates are based on simula-
tions of the estimated model. The model simula-
tions included the assumption that the Fed changes
nonborrowed reserves by enough to eliminate spec-
ified percentages of initial Ml deviations each
month. For example, a four-month control horizon
involves eliminating 25 percent of an initial MI
deviation each month for four straight months.
Constant nominal income and a constant discount
rate were two otherassumptions. It should be noted
that these simulations were not attempts to replicatea sequence of nonborrowed reserves changes that
actually occurred under current procedures. Rather
they were designed for comparison purposes to in-
dicate the interest rate consequences ofalternative
rates ofre-entry to the annual target ranges.
Table 1shows the model's estimates ofthe inter-
est rate consequences of alternative rates of re-
entry. The numbers shown are the cumulative
changes in the commercial paper rate (in basis
points) corresponding to the various control hori-
zons also shown. For example, the three-month
horizon implies that the RU path is designed to
eliminate one-third of a $2 billion Ml deviation
each month for three months. RU is then set to hold
Ml on path for the next three months. The row
labeled three months in Table I shows that under
such a horizon, a $2 billion Ml overshoot would
imply that, in the following six months, the com-
mercialpaperrate would be 68, 107, 121, 69, 50and
45 basis points higher than it would have been if
there had been no change in nonborrowed reserves.
In general, Table I suggests that shorter control
horizons (i.e., faster re-entry rates), require larger
cumulative changes in the commercial paper rate,
and thatthese largerchanges must occursooner. For
example, two-month control requires a 152 basis
point change in the paper rate by the second month
after the Ml deviation, while three-month control
requires a 121 basis point increase in the paper rate
by the third month. The most extreme variability
would occur with one-month control, which re-
quires a 205 basis point change in the paper rate in
the first month following the M1deviation.
The large difference between the one-month and
the two-month control rules has to do with the
behavior of bank loans. Empirical evidence indi-
cates that the public's loan demand responds to a
change in the prime rate with a lag ofone month.
This presumably occurs because corporate and
othertypesofborrowing are controlled by spending
plans which are not revised very much at the same
time that borrowing costs change. In any event, the
lag in the response of bank loans to Fed policy
actions means that a larger interest rate change is
required for a given degree ofmonetary control.
These results suggest that the change in nonbor-
rowed reserves in response to a deviation of MI
from its annual target range could be largerthan it is
currently without large increases in interest rate
volatility. This finding implies that the Fed could
attempt to re-enter the range fOf MI within 2 to 3
months, rather than the 4 to 5 month horizon often
used, without significantly increasing the volatility
ofthe commercial paperrate.
The preceding analysis assumed that income and
prices were unaffected by Ml deviations, but re-
moving this assumption only strengthens the case
for closer monetary control. This subject is dis-
cussed in the next section.
ISv. PolicyImplications and Conclusions
The Federal Reserve's current approach to re-
serve targeting involves a relatively gradual re-
entry to the annual target ranges once a deviation
has occurred. According to the empirical evidence
presented in this paper the re-entry rate may be
shortened at least a few months without causing
significantly larger movements in interest rates.
However, this result by itse?fdoes not necessarily
justify a shortening in the control horizon. The
advisability of such a decision depends upon the
sources of disturbances to the money and reserve
markets that cause the money control errors, and an
assessment ofthe relative costs ofinterest rate vola-
tility relative to the costs ofmoney control errors.
An argument cautioning against a strong reaction
to deviations oftotal reserves from path is that many
deviations are self-correcting. To illustrate, the er-
rorterm from an estimated money demand equation
is relatively large and may account for a large num-
ber of temporary MI and, therefore, total reserves
deviations. These deviations correctthemselves in a
short time without Fed actions that would cause
interest rates to change. However, since it is often
very difficult to distinguish temporary from perma-
nent disturbances, strong Fed reactions could some-
times unnecessarily induce interest rate volatility.
Nevertheless, by seeking to avoid the error of
reacting when it is unnecessary, the Fed runs the
risk ofnot reacting appropriately when disturbances
are persistent. It is the latter error that permits MI
deviations to persist long enough to have an unde-
sired effect on GNP and prices. Thus, even if tem-
porary disturbances occurred more frequently than
persistent disturbances, it might be worthwhile to
choose afasterre-entry rate. Inotherwords, a larger
numberofunnecessary reactions might be less cost-
1y to the economy than a smaller number of large
persistent monetary control errors.
Permanent disturbances to the market for money
oftenrequire very large persistent changes in inter-
estrates to bring Ml back to target. For example,
assume that a sudden surge in bank loans causes MI
to accelerate above its targeted path. If this devia-
tion were not corrected quickly enough, GNP
would also begin to accelerate. Ultimately, interest
rates would have to increase to offset both the surge
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in loans and GNP. If the Fed had taken corrective
action early, it would only have had to offset the
surge in loans. This narrowertask requires asmaller
and less persistent increase in short-term interest
rates.
A problem with persistent swings in short-term
interest rates is that they are likely to show up in
long-term rates. Investors can choose between buy-
ing a long-term security with a maturity equal to
their desired investment period, ora series ofshort-
term securities with maturities that add up to the
investment period. If the Fed were to offset an MI
control error gradually in an investment period,
short-term interest rates would rise gradually in that
same period. Investors anticipating the rise, would
then prefer to buy short-term securities in series,
re-investing each time at the expected higher short-
term rates. They would adopt this strategy unless
the yield on the long-term security also rose. On the
otherhand, they would not need this inducement to
buy the long-term security ifthey expected the MI
control error to be offset quickly by a short, sharp
increase in short-term interest rates. In this way,
gradual re-entry to the MI paths means more persis-
tent movements in short-term interest rates, which
in tum means that longer-term interest rates are
affected to a greater degree by monetary control
actions. These long-term interest rates are ofpoten-
tially great importance because they affect business
investment and housing.
Finally, deviations of Ml from target can also
induce volatility in long-term rates ifthe deviations
are perceived by the public to be persistent enough
to affect inflation. A great deal of empirical evi-
dence links higher inflation with faster growth rates
for money. Thus, when the public sees a persistent
increase in money growth, it may anticipate more
inflation. Long-term interest rates then rise because
they include a premium for inflation. This relation-
ship between money growth and long-term rates is
especially likely to exist when the Treasury runs
large budget deficits and when Federal Reserve
credibility is low. Faster rates ofre-entry to the MI
target can be a more emphatic way ofshowing that
Ml deviations will not persist long enough to affect
inflation.In summary, a more aggressive approach to
short-run monetary control most likely would re-
duce the incidence ofpersistent MI deviations that
have significanteffects onGNP and prices. Such an
approach would also reduce the risk that the Fed
would be forced to induce persistent swings in
short-tenn interest rates to eliminate large money
deviations. Finally, a more aggressive approach
might contribute to the stability oflong-tenn inter-
est rates, which are especially important for the
performance ofthe economy.
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